AdminNeo versions 4.6.0 through at least 5.5.0 are vulnerable to cookie attribute injection via the X-Forwarded-Prefix HTTP header. An attacker who can influence this header (e.g., through a reverse proxy that forwards it from clients, an attacker-controlled upstream proxy, or a man-in-the-middle position) can inject arbitrary cookie attributes including Domain, Path, Secure, and SameSite into all Set-Cookie response headers emitted by AdminNeo.
This allows an attacker to expand the cookie scope to an attacker-controlled domain (e.g., Domain=.evil.com), causing the victim's browser to send AdminNeo's neo_sid (session ID) and neo_key (database password encryption key) cookies to the attacker's server on subsequent requests.
Originally reported by @retkoussa in Adminer: https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-c533-9qwm-8w5h
Root cause 1 - Unsanitized header prepended to REQUEST_URI
(admin/include/bootstrap.inc.php, lines 50–52):
if ($_SERVER["HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PREFIX"]) {
$_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"] = $_SERVER["HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PREFIX"] . $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"];
}
The client-supplied X-Forwarded-Prefix header is concatenated into REQUEST_URI with no validation or sanitization of special characters (specifically semicolons, which delimit cookie attributes).
Root cause 2 - Manual Set-Cookie header construction without escaping
(admin/include/functions.inc.php, lines 416–424):
function cookie(string $name, string $value, int $lifetime = 2592000): void
{
header("Set-Cookie: $name=" . rawurlencode($value)
. ($lifetime ? "; expires=" . gmdate("D, d M Y H:i:s", time() + $lifetime) . " GMT" : "")
. "; path=" . preg_replace('~\?.*~', '', $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"])
. (HTTPS ? "; secure" : "")
. "; HttpOnly; SameSite=lax",
false);
}
The tainted REQUEST_URI is interpolated directly into the path= attribute of the Set-Cookie header. Since semicolons...
5.5.1Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:RScope
S:CImpact
C:HI:LA:N8.2/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:NInput Validation