AdminNeo allows an authenticated SQLite-mode user to delete arbitrary files writable by the PHP process through the database-list drop action. The SQLite driver validates file extensions when creating or renaming databases, but the database-list drop path passes submitted db[] values directly to unlink().
Originally reported by @slpoiuewalspoid-dotcom in Adminer: https://github.com/vrana/adminer/security/advisories/GHSA-6pg3-chwq-wgqc
An authenticated AdminNeo SQLite user with a valid CSRF token can submit an arbitrary relative file path in the database-list db[] field. If the PHP process can delete that path, AdminNeo unlinks it even when the file is not a SQLite database.
The database-list page accepts selected database names from the POST body and calls drop_databases():
if ($_POST["db"]) {
queries_redirect(substr(ME, 0, -1), lang('Databases have been dropped.'), drop_databases($_POST["db"]));
}
In SQLite mode, drop_databases() attaches an in-memory database and unlinks each submitted path directly:
function drop_databases($databases): bool
{
Connection::get()->close(); // to unlock file, doesn't work in PDO on Windows
foreach ($databases as $db) {
if (!@unlink($db)) {
Connection::get()->setError(lang('File exists.'));
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
The same SQLite driver protects create and rename operations with check_sqlite_name(), which requires a .db, .sdb, or .sqlite extension:
function check_sqlite_name($name) {
// avoid creating PHP files on unsecured servers
$extensions = "db|sdb|sqlite";
if (!preg_match("~^[^\\0]*\\.($extensions)\$~", $name)) {
Connection::get()->setError(lang('Please use one of the extensions %s.', str_replace("|", ", ", $extensions)));
return false;
}
return true;
}
The drop path does not apply an equivalent extension check or bind the submitted path to a known listed SQLite database.
5.5.1Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:LUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:NI:HA:H8.1/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:HInput Validation