basic-ftp's CRLF injection protection (added in commit 2ecc8e2 for GHSA-chqc-8p9q-pq6q) is incomplete. Two code paths bypass the protectWhitespace() control character check: (1) the login() method directly concatenates user-supplied credentials into USER/PASS FTP commands without any validation, and (2) the _openDir() method sends an MKD command before cd() invokes protectWhitespace(), creating a TOCTOU bypass. Both vectors allow an attacker who controls input to inject arbitrary FTP commands into the control connection.
The login() method constructs FTP commands by direct string concatenation with no CRLF validation:
// src/Client.ts:216-231
login(user = "anonymous", password = "guest"): Promise<FTPResponse> {
this.ftp.log(`Login security: ${describeTLS(this.ftp.socket)}`)
return this.ftp.handle("USER " + user, (res, task) => { // Line 218: no validation on `user`
// ...
else if (res.code === 331) {
this.ftp.send("PASS " + password) // Line 226: no validation on `password`
}
})
}
FtpContext.send() writes directly to the TCP socket:
// src/FtpContext.ts:223-227
send(command: string) {
// ...
this._socket.write(command + "\r\n", this.encoding)
}
The protectWhitespace() method (line 762) rejects \r, \n, and \0 characters — but it is only called for path-based operations. Credentials never pass through it.
The public access() method (line 268) passes options.user and options.password directly to login() with no sanitization.
The _openDir() method sends an MKD command before the CRLF check in cd():
// src/Client.ts:745-748
protected async _openDir(dirName: string) {
await this.sendIgnoringError("MKD " + dirName) // Line 746: sent BEFORE validation
await this.cd(dirName) // Line...
5.2.2Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:NI:HA:L8.2/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L