GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r

Summary

The attribute-view (database) cell renderer genAVValueHTML interpolates cell content raw in four of its branches: text, url, phone, and mAsset. A cell value like </textarea><img src=x onerror="..."> or "><img src=x onerror="..."> breaks out of its surrounding tag and runs arbitrary JavaScript in the renderer when the victim opens the block-attribute panel. On Electron desktop the renderer runs with nodeIntegration:true, so the XSS chains to host RCE via require('child_process'). AV files live under the workspace and ride normal sync, so an attacker with write access to any synced workspace plants the payload once and it fires on every device that opens a panel containing that row.

The kernel doesn't escape on the way in either, so the malicious cell persists byte-for-byte. There's no equivalent of the html.EscapeAttrVal call that protects block IAL attributes at kernel/model/blockial.go:261.

Companion advisory: GHSA-mvjr-vv3c-w4qv. Same workspace-sync to renderer-sink to Electron-RCE pattern in the CSS-snippet renderer, different sink file. Worth auditing for the same pattern in other renderers that pull from synced workspace data.

Details

Affected:

• HEAD 96dfe0b (v3.6.5, 2026-04-21)
• Renderer sink: app/src/protyle/render/av/blockAttr.ts:68, genAVValueHTML(). The text, url, phone, and mAsset branches interpolate cell content raw.
• Callsites piping genAVValueHTML into innerHTML: select.ts:124,229,346, cell.ts:791,913,1198, col.ts:455,656,1256, filter.ts:199,471,609,702, groups.ts:56,289,328,378, and blockAttr.ts:212.
• Source: cell values returned by /api/av/getAttributeView. Backing store: data/storage/av/<avID>.json.
• Write path: kernel/model/attribute_view.go, updateAttributeViewValue and (*Transaction).doUpdateAttrViewCell. No call to html.EscapeAttrVal, html.EscapeString, or util.EscapeHTML anywhere in the file.
• Electron config: nodeIntegration:true,...