GHSA-4vv7-jj25-4gh6

Summary

Microsoft Kiota emitted the x-ms-kiota-info extension's clientClassName or clientNamespaceName value raw, with no identifier or path sanitization, as both the generated client's class/namespace name and part of the generated output path. When kiota generate is run without -c/--class-name — the zero-config workflow that x-ms-kiota-info is explicitly designed for (the API provider supplies the names in the description so consumers don't have to) — an attacker who controls or tampers with the OpenAPI description could therefore:

• (CWE-22) write the generated source file to a path outside the -o output directory — e.g. clientClassName: "/var/www/html/shell"; and
• (CWE-94) inject arbitrary text into the generated class/namespace declaration, corrupting the generated client.

Confirmed on Kiota 1.32.4 (the self-contained linux-x64 release binary), i.e. after the earlier writer-sink hardening — that fix escaped property/enum/default/serialization sinks but never sanitized the provider-supplied clientClassName / clientNamespaceName.

Details

clientClassName reached two unsanitized sinks (observed in the generated C#; the same raw emission occurred for Java, Go, TypeScript, Python, and PHP):

# output FILENAME (CWE-22): clientClassName flows into the file path
clientClassName: "/abs/path/PWNED"   ->   /abs/path/PWNED.cs   (written outside -o)

# class declaration (CWE-94): clientClassName flows verbatim into the type declaration
clientClassName: 'Pwn { } public class INJECTED { } public partial class RealClient'
   ->  public partial class Pwn { } public class INJECTED { } public partial class RealClient : ... { }

clientNamespaceName reached the analogous namespace/path sinks.

Impact

A developer or CI host generating a client from an attacker-controlled or compromised OpenAPI description (without -c) could create/overwrite a generated source file at an attacker-influenced...