An inconsistency in MethodNode can be exploited to access unexpected object fields through dot notation. This can be used to achieve arbitrary code execution at load time.
While this issue may seem similar to https://github.com/skops-dev/skops/security/advisories/GHSA-m7f4-hrc6-fwg3, it is actually more severe, as it relies on fewer assumptions about trusted types.
The MethodNode allows access to attributes of existing objects via dot notation. However, there are several critical shortcomings:
Although the __class__ and __module__ fields are checked via get_untrusted_types and during the load phase (as a concatenated string), they are not actually used by MethodNode. Instead, the func and obj entries in the schema.json are used to determine behavior. This means that even an apparently harmless __module__.__class__ pair can lead to access of arbitrary attributes or methods of loaded objects, without any additional checks.
Nothing prevents an attacker from chaining multiple MethodNode instances to traverse the object hierarchy and access harmful attributes.
An object can be loaded using the ObjectNode, which normally enforces strict checks and allows only trusted or explicitly permitted objects. However, once the object is loaded, dot notation can be used to access any of its attributes or methods. Furthermore, by chaining multiple MethodNodes, one can traverse the Python object hierarchy and reach dangerous components such as the builtins dictionary—which contains functions like exec and eval.
This vulnerability allows the attacker to bypass both get_untrusted_types and load checks, enabling access to dangerous attributes and methods without triggering any alerts. As demonstrated in the PoC, arbitrary code execution is possible using just an anonymous object returned by get_untrusted_types (in the example, builtins.int, though any type would suffice since it doesn't...
0.12.0Exploitability
AV:LAC:LAT:PPR:NUI:AVulnerable System
VC:HVI:HVA:HSubsequent System
SC:HSI:HSA:H8.7/CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:HOther