In GitPython <= 3.1.52, the config writer neutralizes only CR, LF, and NUL in configuration names, but writes section names into the [...] header with no other escaping. A section/subsection name that contains ] [ " closes the intended header and opens a second same-line section, injecting an arbitrary config directive — with no newline required. Because a submodule name is attacker-controlled data (it comes from a repository's .gitmodules, or from an application that lets a user name a submodule) and is written verbatim into the parent repository's trusted .git/config, an attacker can set core.sshCommand (or alias.*, core.pager, core.fsmonitor) and achieve remote code execution on the victim's next git operation. Likely CWE-74 (Injection).
This is a distinct variant of the injection addressed by GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w / GHSA-v87r-6q3f-2j67: those fixed newline injection into config values/names (patched in 3.1.50); the [r\n\x00] guard added for them does not stop a same-line section break inside a name.
The only guard applied to section/option names before writing is _assure_config_name_safe, which uses a regex that matches solely CR/LF/NUL:
git/config.py:75,897-899 (GitPython 3.1.52):
UNSAFE_CONFIG_CHARS_RE = re.compile(r"[\r\n\x00]")
...
def _assure_config_name_safe(self, name: "cp._SectionName", label: str) -> None:
if isinstance(name, str) and UNSAFE_CONFIG_CHARS_RE.search(name):
raise ValueError("Git config %s names must not contain CR, LF, or NUL" % label)
The name is then serialized into the header with no escaping of ], [, ", space, = or #:
git/config.py:693:
fp.write(("[%s]\n" % name).encode(defenc))
For submodules the name is wrapped as submodule "<name>" (git/objects/submodule/util.py:39, return f'submodule "{name}"'), which supplies the balancing quote. A submodule named:
x"] [core] sshCommand=CMD #
therefore...
3.1.53Exploitability
AV:LAC:HPR:NUI:RScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:HA:H7.0/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HInput Validation