GHSA-37h2-6p4f-mp3q

Summary

Serena's built-in web dashboard exposes an unauthenticated Flask API on a fixed, predictable port (TCP 24282, hardcoded as 0x5EDA in constants.py). The server has no authentication, no CSRF protection, and no Host header validation. A DNS rebinding attack allows a malicious webpage to reach this API from any browser and write arbitrary content to the agent's persistent memory store — which the agent reads and acts on autonomously. Combined with execute_shell_command (enabled by default in all contexts via shell=True), this creates a full remote code execution chain requiring only that the victim visit a malicious webpage while Serena is running.

Details

Root cause 1 — Unauthenticated dashboard (src/serena/dashboard.py)

The Flask server starts automatically (web_dashboard: true by default) on a fixed, predictable port with no auth middleware:

# src/serena/constants.py
DASHBOARD_API_BASE_PORT = 0x5EDA  # = 24282, always the same

# src/serena/dashboard.py — no auth, no CSRF, no Host header validation on any route
@self._app.route("/save_memory", methods=["POST"])
def save_memory():
    request_data = request.get_json()
    self._save_memory(...)  # writes to disk, no credentials checked

@self._app.route("/shutdown", methods=["PUT"])
def shutdown():
    self._agent.shutdown()  # kills the agent, no credentials checked

Flask does not validate the Host header by default (no SERVER_NAME set), which is the prerequisite for DNS rebinding.

Root cause 2 — execute_shell_command uses shell=True (src/serena/util/shell.py)

subprocess.Popen(
    command,     # attacker-controlled string from injected memory
    shell=True,  # enables shell metacharacter injection
    ...
)

This tool is enabled in every default context YAML: ide.yml, vscode.yml, claude-code.yml, copilot-cli.yml, codex.yml, jb-ai-assistant.yml, junie.yml, antigravity.yml.

PoC

**Step 1 — Verify...