Affected: @hulumi/baseline < 1.4.0 — Fixed in: 1.4.0 — Severity: High — CWE-1059 (Insufficient Technical Documentation / Behavioral Inconsistency)
The S3 bucket that AccountFoundation creates to receive CloudTrail and AWS Config audit logs is meant to be tamper-resistant — if someone with delete access can erase from it, the forensic trail is gone. There were three independent ways the protection could be silently weakened:
objectLock: false on the audit bucket. (The reason was real — bucket-wide Object Lock blocks an AWS Config write-then-delete probe — but the fix was a sledgehammer that disabled WORM for all objects, not just the probe key.)forceDestroy was forwarded to the audit bucket. Nothing prevented a downstream stack from setting logBucketForceDestroy: true, which made pulumi destroy purge every audit-log object on teardown.AccountFoundation created its audit bucket with tier: "sandbox", which skipped Object Lock, server access logging, AND the CloudTrail-Lake EventDataStore (the independent immutable mirror) — leaving sandbox accounts with no audit immutability at all.Consumers using AccountFoundation could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal — while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded).
Upgrade to @hulumi/baseline@1.4.0. A single invariant in SecureBucket now fires whenever the bucket actually backs CloudTrail/Config delivery (i.e. awsServiceLogDelivery.cloudTrail === true || .config === true):
forceDestroy: true on the startup-hardened tier;EventDataStore regardless of...1.4.0Exploitability
AV:NAC:LAT:NPR:LUI:NVulnerable System
VC:NVI:HVA:NSubsequent System
SC:NSI:NSA:N7.1/CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NOther