HistoryTreeProof::verify panics on a malformed proof where history.len() != positions.len() due to assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len()).
The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (ResponseTransactionsProof.proof) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch.
The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0.
No known workarounds know.
Exploitability
AV:NAC:HPR:NUI:RScope
S:UImpact
C:NI:NA:L3.1/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L