CVE-2025-38154

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf, sockmap: Avoid using sk_socket after free when sending

The sk->sk_socket is not locked or referenced in backlog thread, and during the call to skb_send_sock(), there is a race condition with the release of sk_socket. All types of sockets(tcp/udp/unix/vsock) will be affected.

Race conditions: ''' CPU0 CPU1

backlog::skb_send_sock sendmsg_unlocked sock_sendmsg sock_sendmsg_nosec close(fd): ... ops->release() -> sock_map_close() sk_socket->ops = NULL free(socket) sock->ops->sendmsg ^ panic here '''

The ref of psock become 0 after sock_map_close() executed. ''' void sock_map_close() { ... if (likely(psock)) { ... // !! here we remove psock and the ref of psock become 0 sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock) psock = sk_psock_get(sk); if (unlikely(!psock)) goto no_psock; <=== Control jumps here via goto ... cancel_delayed_work_sync(&psock->work); <=== not executed sk_psock_put(sk, psock); ... } '''

Based on the fact that we already wait for the workqueue to finish in sock_map_close() if psock is held, we simply increase the psock reference count to avoid race conditions.

With this patch, if the backlog thread is running, sock_map_close() will wait for the backlog thread to complete and cancel all pending work.

If no backlog running, any pending work that hasn't started by then will fail when invoked by sk_psock_get(), as the psock reference count have been zeroed, and sk_psock_drop() will cancel all jobs via cancel_delayed_work_sync().

In summary, we require synchronization to coordinate the backlog thread and close() thread.

The panic I catched: ''' Workqueue: events...