An issue was discovered in Xen through 4.14.x. Access rights of Xenstore nodes are per domid. Unfortunately, existing granted access rights are not removed when a domain is being destroyed. This means that a new domain created with the same domid will inherit the access rights to Xenstore nodes from the previous domain(s) with the same domid. Because all Xenstore entries of a guest below /local/domain/<domid> are being deleted by Xen tools when a guest is destroyed, only Xenstore entries of other guests still running are affected. For example, a newly created guest domain might be able to read sensitive information that had belonged to a previously existing guest domain. Both Xenstore implementations (C and Ocaml) are vulnerable.
Exploitability
AV:LAC:LPR:LUI:NScope
S:CImpact
C:HI:HA:H8.8/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H