A flaw was found in Foreman’s Api::V2::PersonalAccessTokensController, where Foreman::Controller::UserAware#find_user resolves the target account using User.find(params[:user_id]) without applying the required parent-user authorization check. An attacker with the create_personal_access_tokens permission can therefore invoke POST /api/v2/users/:user_id/personal_access_tokens with another user’s ID and create a Personal Access Token on their behalf. The resulting plaintext token is returned in the API response, while PersonalAccessToken#check_permissions_after_save only validates create_personal_access_tokens on the token and does not enforce edit_users authorization on the target user. The attacker can then use the forged token to authenticate as the victim, potentially resulting in complete account takeover, including administrator accounts.
0:3.12.0.26-1.el8sat0:3.12.0.26-1.el9sat0:3.14.0.26-1.el9sat0:3.16.0.29-1.el9sat0:3.18.0.19-1.el9satExploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:LUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:HA:H8.8/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H