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The package is a dependency-confusion lure targeting internal USDm/Utila minting tooling. setup.py defines an _exfil() routine that runs both at module import time and inside a custom install cmdclass, so it fires on pip install as well as any sdist build. _exfil() reads wallet and cloud secrets from environment variables (PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, USDM_PRIVATE_KEY, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, UTILA_SA_PRIVATE_KEY and similar), reads.env files from the current working directory and $HOME, and recursively collects.pem/.key/.json/.yaml files under ~/.utila and ~/.config/utila. The collected material is JSON-encoded and POSTed via urllib.request.urlopen to a hardcoded destination, https://webhook.site/ec3e3cb9-4cc1-4cb8-a273-4811768a631d (overridable via COLLECTOR_URL). The top-level usdm_minting_client/init.py repeats the exfiltration on every import usdm_minting_client, sending USDM_PRIVATE_KEY, PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, USDM_RPC_URL and the contents of ~/.env and ~/.usdm.env to the same collector endpoint. A header comment in setup.py self-describes the package as a dependency-confusion PoC impersonating an internal usdm-minting-client, and the metadata uses a placeholder homepage (example.com) with a free-mail author address, consistent with a lure rather than a legitimate release.
During installation the package exfiltrates credential files and environment variables, focusing on cryptocurrency- and cloud-related entries. The package seems to be targeting users of a package from GitHub (https://github.com/ethena-labs/usdm-minting-client) which has not been published to PyPI.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign:...
0.1.00.1.10.1.20.1.3Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:CImpact
C:HI:HA:H10.0/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H