The symbolic-link branch of ZipArchive::extract_internal() allocates a buffer using an attacker-declared size before reading any entry data. A 112-byte archive terminates the extracting process with SIGABRT through this infallible allocation.
#[cfg(any(unix, windows))]
if file.is_symlink() {
let mut target = Vec::with_capacity(file.size() as usize); // @audit unbounded memory allocation
file.read_to_end(&mut target)?;
drop(file);
make_symlink(&outpath, &target, &self.shared.files)?;
continue;
}
src/read/mod.rs#L399-L405 (reviewed commit 6f09b306); the same code is at src/read.rs#L417-L418 in released v8.6.0.
Both inputs are attacker-controlled:
ZipFile::size() returns uncompressed_size verbatim from the central directory record. A ZIP64 extended-information extra field widens it to a full u64 (src/read/mod.rs#L619-L625). It is never cross-checked against the compressed size, the remaining archive length, or any platform-appropriate bound for a symlink target.ZipFile::is_symlink() is decided entirely by the central directory's external-attributes field, via the S_IFLNK bit.Memory allocation failure → uncatchable process abort. The reservation is sized from the declared uncompressed_size before a single byte of the entry is read. Vec::with_capacity() is infallible: on allocator refusal it calls handle_alloc_error(), which aborts the process. This is not a Rust panic — it is not...
9.0.0Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:NI:NA:H7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HOther
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