Zebra failed to enforce a ZIP-244 consensus rule for V5 transparent transactions: when an input is signed with SIGHASH_SINGLE and there is no transparent output at the same index as that input, validation must fail. Zebra instead asked the underlying sighash library to compute a digest, and that library produced a digest over an empty output set rather than failing. An attacker could craft a V5 transaction with more transparent inputs than outputs that Zebra accepts but zcashd rejects, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes.
A previous fix (GHSA-cwfq-rfcr-8hmp) addressed a closely related case in the same area of the code, but did not cover this specific one.
Critical - This is a Consensus Vulnerability that could allow a malicious party to induce network partitioning, service disruption, and potential double-spend attacks against affected nodes.
Note that the impact is currently alleviated by the fact that currently most miners run zcashd.
Zebra 4.4.0.
Verification of transparent transactions inherits the Bitcoin Script verification code in C++. Since it is consensus-critical, this code is called from Zebra through a foreign function interface (FFI), with a Rust callback that computes the sighash for each input being verified.
ZIP-244 §S.2a marks two situations as consensus failure for V5 transparent signatures:
SIGHASH_SINGLE (alone or combined with ANYONECANPAY) and the input has no transparent output at the same index.zcashd enforces both rules: its SignatureHash raises an exception, and CheckSig catches it and fails the script. A previous fix (GHSA-cwfq-rfcr-8hmp) added the first rule to...
6.0.14.4.1Exploitability
AV:NAC:LAT:NPR:NUI:NVulnerable System
VC:NVI:HVA:HSubsequent System
SC:NSI:HSA:H9.3/CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H