Summary
Cloudreve's server-side request forgery guard ValidateExternalURL (pkg/request/ssrf.go) resolves a user-supplied URL host and rejects it when any resolved IP is a loopback, private, link-local, multicast, unspecified, CGNAT, or the cloud-metadata address. The classification is performed by checkIP, which uses Go's net.IP builtins (IsLoopback, IsPrivate, IsLinkLocalUnicast, ...) directly on the resolved address. These builtins inspect only the outer IPv6 address and do not decode IPv4-in-IPv6 transition wrappers. An attacker who controls a hostname's AAAA record (or, on a DNS64/NAT64 network, any hostname) can point the remote-download URL at a NAT64 well-known-prefix address (64:ff9b::a.b.c.d, RFC 6052), an IPv4-compatible address (::a.b.c.d, RFC 4291), or a 6to4 address (2002:AABB:CCDD::, RFC 3056) that wraps an internal IPv4. Go classifies these wrappers as ordinary global IPv6 addresses, so checkIP accepts them; the network then delivers the request to the embedded internal IPv4 (loopback, RFC 1918, or the cloud instance metadata service 169.254.169.254). This bypasses the SSRF guard that was added to block direct access to internal services.
Affected component and versions
pkg/request/ssrf.go (ValidateExternalURL / checkIP), reached from the remote-download workflow pkg/filemanager/workflows/remote_download.go (RemoteDownloadTask.createDownloadTask, which passes the user-supplied SrcUri to ValidateExternalURL).<= 4.17.0 (latest release at time of report) and current main.Vulnerable form vs correctly-guarded sibling
checkIP DOES block IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:a.b.c.d), because Go's net.IP.To4() returns the embedded IPv4 for that form and the standard checks then fire. It does NOT block the other IPv4-in-IPv6 transition forms, because for those To4()...
4.0.0-20260715072853-1c5cad6dec7eExploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:LUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:NA:N6.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NInput Validation
Other