A security issue exists where unauthenticated callers can instruct the AIT-GUI server to execute arbitrary Python scripts. The attack vector involves obtaining a session cookie through GET /, followed by a malicious POST /script/run request containing an absolute file path that bypasses the configured script directory restrictions.
This vulnerability allows unauthenticated remote code execution on the AIT-GUI server. Any attacker with network access can execute arbitrary Python code with daemon privileges.
Chain:
POST /tlm/query writes the user-controlled fields value into fields_in.txt under the AIT-GUI static directory.
dataDir has no .pcap files, the route returns the expected 400 Bad Request before deleting that file.POST /script/run accepts scriptPath=../static/fields_in.txt.
Relevant code:
ait/gui/__init__.py:930,935,942-944: /tlm/query writes fields to fields_in.txt.ait/gui/__init__.py:952-958,978: the no-PCAP error path aborts before cleanup.ait/gui/__init__.py:1130-1136: /script/run joins scriptPath with ScriptRoot and only checks that the path exists.ait/gui/__init__.py:1186-1191: the selected file is read and executed as Python.ait/gui/__init__.py:1105-1108: nearby /scripts/load/<name> has a path containment check, but /script/run does not.Restricted script execution paths and avoided using static temp files.
POST /tlm/query writes the user-controlled fields value into fields_in.txt under the AIT-GUI static directory.
dataDir has no .pcap files, the route returns the expected 400 Bad Request before deleting that file.# Remove file to ensure nothing exists
AIT-GUI % rm <path>/fields_in.txt
# With server started, send POST request to /tlm/query endpoint
AIT-GUI % curl -X POST...
2.5.1Exploitability
AV:AAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:HA:H8.8/CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HInput Validation
Other