ReadWriteLock and AsyncReadWriteLock resolve the lock path with pathlib.Path.resolve() and pass it to sqlite3.connect() without refusing a symlink. A local user who can create names in the lock's directory, such as /tmp or a shared cache, can plant a symlink at the lock path and make the victim's process create, lock, or write the file it points to, or break mutual exclusion between the victim's own processes.
ReadWriteLock.__init__ stores pathlib.Path(lock_file).resolve(), which follows a final symlink, and every connection opens that path through sqlite3.connect() with no O_NOFOLLOW or regular-file check. SQLite's own VFS also resolves the final symlink in user space, so fs.protected_symlinks and the sticky bit do not help: the kernel never sees a symlink to refuse. The other lock classes do not follow a final symlink: FileLock opens with O_NOFOLLOW, and SoftReadWriteLock coordinates through <path>.rw/.
On Linux, with the victim and attacker as different users and /shared mode 1777 with fs.protected_symlinks=1:
ln -s /home/victim/private/pwned.flag /shared/app.rwlock.db.ReadWriteLock("/shared/app.rwlock.db"). A plain os.open(..., O_NOFOLLOW) on the same path fails, but the lock creates /home/victim/private/pwned.flag, owned by the victim, inside a directory the attacker cannot write./shared/cache.rwlock.db -> /shared/a.db, one victim process holds the write lock. The attacker repoints the link to /shared/b.db, and a second victim process acquires the write lock while the first still holds it.The same behavior reproduces on macOS, on Windows 11, and through AsyncReadWriteLock.
A local attacker with write access to the lock directory can make the victim create empty files it owns at paths the attacker cannot write, make the victim hold a SQLite lock on another application's database so that...
4.0.9Exploitability
AV:LAC:LPR:LUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:NI:HA:L6.1/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:LFile System
Other