9.0.0-pre37.2.0 and laterThe validation applied to symlinks is purely lexical.
As a result, an attacker can write arbitrary files outside the extraction directory through a symlink.
Exploitation requires the attacker to know (or guess) the absolute path of the destination, but this is realistic in practice: CI workspaces, /opt/app, a fixed Downloads path, and so on.
Impact extends further on Windows (verified on real hardware for both the separate-drive and UNC-share cases):
Becausesimplified_componentsdiscards thePrefixcomponent, paths likeD:\<same tail as dest>or a UNC path\\attacker\share\<same tail>pass thestarts_withcheck.
As a result,outpath.pushgets replaced onto a different drive/remote share, so a single symlink is enough — no intermediate symlink chain is required.
That said, creating a symlink on Windows requiresSeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege(administrator rights or Developer Mode enabled). Real-hardware verification (Windows 10 VM (19045.2604),tests/poc_win.rs):
With the extraction target set to a temporary directory underC:, both of the following paths returnedOk(())fromextract()and successfully wrote outside the extraction target.
In both casesextract()returned no error (Ok(())), and it was confirmed that the contents ofpwned.txtmatched the attacker-specified value.
This is not a duplicate of the existing CVE-2025-29787 (2025-03); rather, the protection introduced for that CVE was subsequently lost.
| commit | Date | Description |...
9.0.0Exploitability
AV:NAC:HPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:NI:HA:H7.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H