The Kubeflow Pipelines frontend reflected untrusted pod names and namespaces into HTML error responses from the pod-information and pod-events routes. An attacker could craft a link that causes JavaScript to execute in the frontend's origin when a user follows it and reaches an affected error response.
Affected routes include /pipeline/k8s/pod and /pipeline/k8s/pod/events (the deployment's configured base path may differ).
Successful exploitation requires a victim to open an attacker-supplied link and reach the vulnerable response. JavaScript execution may expose information accessible to the victim's browser or perform actions in the application's origin.
The attacker does not need an account merely to construct and deliver the link. The victim must satisfy the deployment's authentication and route-access requirements. Cookie theft depends on cookie attributes and deployment protections; it is not guaranteed. The submitted evidence does not establish an availability impact or server-side code execution.
The pod handlers pass podname and podnamespace query values to getPod and listPodEvents in frontend/server/k8s-helper.ts. Before remediation, failure messages incorporated those values, along with backend error details, and were returned as HTML-capable string responses.
Kubernetes rejecting an invalid resource name did not prevent the issue: the rejected name could still be included in the frontend's error response.
PR #12295 changed the error construction to validate pod names and namespaces with isAllowedResourceName. Invalid values produce a constant error message instead of reflecting the supplied value, and backend error details are no longer included in these responses. The change includes invalid-resource-name tests.
Affected product: the Kubeflow Pipelines frontend server, identified...
0.0.0-20251010122814-fedc25e3f725Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:RScope
S:CImpact
C:LI:LA:N6.1/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:NInjection