BllipParser in nltk/parse/bllip.py hands caller-supplied filesystem paths to the native bllipparser C extension without routing them through NLTK's pathsec validation. The constructor parameters parser_model, reranker_features, and reranker_weights, and the alternative from_unified_model_dir() entry point, flow directly to the C extension's load_parser_model() and load_reranker_model() calls, which open and read the given path at the OS level. Any application that passes an attacker-influenced path to this API reads a file of the attacker's choosing from anywhere on the filesystem, outside the NLTK data roots that every other NLTK tool wrapper confines access to.
As of NLTK 3.10.0, SECURITY.md documents a centralized I/O security module (nltk.pathsec) with strict enforcement enabled by default, under which file-backed resources must resolve inside allowed NLTK data directories. For paths handed to external tools and native extensions that open files themselves, the module provides validate_tool_path(), which runs name-safety checks, rejects option-shaped, URL-shaped, and traversal inputs, opens the path with O_NOFOLLOW requiring a regular single-linked file, and returns the validated string the caller must use. Every sibling tool wrapper applies it. BllipParser applies none of it: the module imports only ParserI, safe_print, and Tree, with zero pathsec references, so the three model-path parameters reach the C extension unchecked. The violated invariant is that NLTK tool wrappers must bound caller-supplied native-tool paths to the data roots before the native code opens them.
nltk/parse/bllip.py:125-131 BllipParser.__init__ accepts parser_model,
reranker_features, reranker_weights (no validation)
nltk/parse/bllip.py:164 self.rrp.load_parser_model(parser_model, ...) -> C extension open
nltk/parse/bllip.py:166-170...
3.10.4Exploitability
AV:LAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:NA:L6.8/CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:LInput Validation
Resource Management