The CVE-2026-32885 ZipSlip fix added a symlink-target escape check to Untar, but the check rebases an ABSOLUTE symlink target into dest before validating (filepath.Join(dest, "/etc") stays lexically inside dest and passes), while the symlink is then created with the RAW absolute target via os.Symlink(file.Linkname, ...), so a malicious archive plants a host-absolute symlink and a following regular-file entry writes through it, restoring arbitrary host file create/overwrite (reaching $HOME rc-files, hence RCE). Confirmed at HEAD.
CVE-2026-32885 (fixed v1.25.2, commit 05cbe299) added a lexical containment check on the entry path and a NEW symlink-target validation. pkg/archive/archive.go, Untar, tar.TypeSymlink case:
if filepath.IsAbs(file.Linkname) {
resolvedTarget = filepath.Join(dest, file.Linkname) // line 298: absolute target REBASED into dest
} else {
resolvedTarget = filepath.Join(fullPathDir, file.Linkname)
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Clean(resolvedTarget)+sep, filepath.Clean(dest)+sep) { // line 302
return ...escapes destination... // line 303
}
_ = os.Remove(fullPath) // line 307
err = os.Symlink(file.Linkname, fullPath) // line 310: writes the RAW Linkname
For an absolute Linkname like /Users/victim, line 298 computes filepath.Join(dest, "/Users/victim") = dest/Users/victim (lexically inside dest), so the escape check at line 302 PASSES. But line 310 creates the symlink with the raw file.Linkname, so the on-disk symlink dest/link points at the real host path /Users/victim. The value validated (rebased) is not the value written (raw): a check-one-thing / do-another divergence.
Write-through: the archive carries a second regular-file entry whose Name traverses the planted link (e.g. link/.zshrc). Its fullPath is lexically inside dest so the line-238 check passes (that check...
1.25.4Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:RScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:HA:H8.8/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HFile System
Input Validation