nltk.classify.weka.ARFF_Formatter writes class labels directly into the Weka ARFF @ATTRIBUTE '-label-' {...} declaration without any ARFF quoting or escaping. An attacker who can contribute class labels to a training dataset can include ARFF metacharacters such as }, newlines, @ATTRIBUTE, and @DATA to break out of the nominal label list and inject attacker‑controlled ARFF schema and data directives.
This vulnerability is reachable in any application that calls WekaClassifier.train() or ARFF_Formatter.from_train() with attacker‑influenced training data. The victim does not need to manually edit the ARFF file; the normal training workflow writes the malformed ARFF automatically.
The vulnerable code path is:
WekaClassifier.train() calls ARFF_Formatter.from_train(featuresets).from_train() extracts labels from the training data and passes them to ARFF_Formatter(labels, features).header_section() uses ",".join(self._labels) directly, embedding attacker‑controlled strings into the ARFF header without sanitization.Because the label names are not escaped, a label containing safe}\n@ATTRIBUTE injected NUMERIC\n@DATA\n0,owned\n% will close the label set, inject a new attribute, start a premature data section, and comment out the remaining header.
The following self‑contained Python script demonstrates the vulnerability. It requires only NLTK and does not need Weka to be installed, because the attack is carried out purely by generating the ARFF string.
from nltk.classify.weka import ARFF_Formatter
# Attacker‑controlled label containing ARFF metacharacters.
# The `}` closes the label set, the `@ATTRIBUTE` injects a new attribute,
# `@DATA` starts the data section early, and `%` comments out the rest.
malicious_label = "safe}\n@ATTRIBUTE injected NUMERIC\n@DATA\n0,owned\n%"
featuresets = [
({"f": "benign"}, "legit"), # legitimate...
3.10.4Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:LUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:NI:LA:L5.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:LInput Validation