write_attachments() called _safe_attachment_filename() and write_sample() inside its loop
with no guard, so a single crafted attachment raised out of the whole save. Every attachment
after the malicious one was silently never written, with no error surfaced to a caller that
catches only MailParserError.
That is an evasion primitive as much as an availability bug: a sender puts one poisoned part first and the real payload second, and the payload never reaches the extraction directory that a downstream scanner or sandbox reads — while it still reaches the recipient's mail client intact. The tool's output diverges from the bytes actually in the message, which is the same failure mode as the filename-sanitizing bypass in GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496.
Three shapes were reachable, all from attacker-controlled MIME metadata:
filename*=us-ascii''evil%00.bin decodes to a NUL in the
filename during parsing and raised ValueError out of the name check;NAME_MAX (e.g. 300 characters) raised
OSError: File name too long from open(), after creating a zero-byte stub on disk;binascii.Error (a
ValueError subclass) from the decode performed inside the open() block.import tempfile, mailparser
raw = ("Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=b\r\n\r\n"
"--b\r\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n"
"Content-Disposition: attachment; filename*=us-ascii''evil%00.bin\r\n\r\nxx\r\n"
"--b\r\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n"
"Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=good.bin\r\n\r\nyy\r\n"
"--b--\r\n")
mp = mailparser.parse_from_string(raw) # parse itself is fine; safe_filename is None
mp.write_attachments(tempfile.mkdtemp())
# 4.6.0 - 4.6.2 ->...
4.6.3Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:NI:LA:L6.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L