The traversal fix for CVE-2026-33344 was implemented as HTTP middleware installed only in the chi handler chain, but the MCP service calls the same API method in process, so arbitrary YAML file read is reachable again through the MCP tool surface with a viewer-role key. Read-only, limited to .yaml/.yml targets. Confirmed at HEAD f6c039f (post v2.10.7).
The fix for CVE-2026-33344 is a reflection-based HTTP middleware (internal/frontend/.../api.go, roughly lines 553-597) that inspects a request field named FileName and rejects anything that is not a plain name. It is installed in exactly one place: the chi strict-handler chain (api.go around line 419).
The MCP service does not go through that chain. internal/service/mcp/server.go calls the API method directly as an in-process Go call:
func (svc *Service) getDAGSpec(ctx context.Context, name string) (map[string]any, error) { // line 307
resp, err := svc.api.GetDAGSpec(ctx, daguapi.GetDAGSpecRequestObject{
FileName: daguapi.DAGFileName(name), // line 309
})
No HTTP request is constructed, so no middleware executes, and the underlying resolver is still uncontained:
func (store *Storage) locateDAG(nameOrPath string) (string, error) { // line 1041
if strings.Contains(nameOrPath, string(filepath.Separator)) { // line 1042
foundPath, err := findDAGFile(nameOrPath)
if err == nil {
return foundPath, nil // line 1045, no containment check
}
}
An absolute path contains a separator, so it takes the first branch and is returned as-is, with no check that it falls under store.baseDir or any entry in store.searchPaths.
Verified end to end using the project's own conformance/mcptest harness against a real running HTTP server, not by source reading:
dagu_read...
2.11.0Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:LUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:NA:N6.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NAccess Control
Input Validation