qs.stringify() calls utils.isBuffer() on every value it serializes, and utils.isBuffer() invokes obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj) without checking that it is callable. A value whose own constructor.isBuffer is a non-function makes qs call a non-callable and throw TypeError. Such a value is produced by qs.parse itself from an untrusted query string when plainObjects: true or allowPrototypes: true is set, so a pure-qs parse → stringify round-trip — no JSON.parse — turns an unauthenticated query string into an uncaught throw.
An attacker-controlled parse input reaches the host application's availability asset — via qs's own recommended plainObjects mitigation — and triggers an uncaught exception during a parse → stringify round-trip.
utils.isBuffer runs at lib/stringify.js:127 for every serialized value:
if (isNonNullishPrimitive(obj) || utils.isBuffer(obj)) { ... }
utils.isBuffer (lib/utils.js:327-333) invokes obj.constructor.isBuffer without verifying it is callable:
var isBuffer = function isBuffer(obj) {
if (!obj || typeof obj !== 'object') { return false; }
return !!(obj.constructor && obj.constructor.isBuffer && obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj));
};
constructor and isBuffer are ordinary keys. qs.parse with plainObjects: true or allowPrototypes: true keeps them as own properties, so the parsed value carries a non-function constructor.isBuffer; stringify then calls a non-callable and throws TypeError. By contrast utils.isRegExp uses a brand check (Object.prototype.toString); the missing guard here is an internal inconsistency, not a platform limitation.
qs.stringify alone treats its input as caller-constructed, so serializing a hostile object could be argued outside its contract. This report does not depend on that framing: the malicious shape is produced by qs.parse, whose input is untrusted by design....
6.16.0Exploitability
AV:NAC:LAT:PPR:NUI:NVulnerable System
VC:NVI:NVA:LSubsequent System
SC:NSI:NSA:N6.3/CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N