Route selection uses the raw un-normalized request path, and the per-route ACL and basic-auth gates hang off that selection, so a dot-segment, encoded-dot, or double-slash variant of a protected path selects a different route, skips both gates, and is forwarded to the backend which normalizes and serves the protected resource. Unauthenticated; complete bypass of the access control the operator configured. Confirmed at HEAD b841544. Direct peers: Traefik CVE-2023-47106, Envoy CVE-2019-9901.
fabio never normalizes the request path. A repository-wide search for path.Clean returns zero results. Route selection uses the raw path (route/table.go line 487: if target = t.lookup(h, req.URL.Path, pick, match); target != nil {). Both access-control gates are properties of the target that lookup returned:
// proxy/http_proxy.go
if t.AccessDeniedHTTP(r) { // line 111, per-route allow / deny:ip ACL
http.Error(w, "access denied", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
if !t.Authorized(r, w, p.AuthSchemes) { // line 116, per-route auth= basic auth
http.Error(w, "authorization failed", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
and the same raw path is forwarded verbatim (Path: r.URL.Path at line 142). So /./admin/, /%2e/admin/, //admin/ and /x/../admin/ do not match the protected /admin route. They fall through to the catch-all / route, which carries no ACL and no auth, and fabio forwards the un-normalized path to the origin, which normalizes it and serves the protected resource.
Verified end to end against the real binary at HEAD, not a synthetic unit test. fabio was built and run with static routes against a python3 -m http.server origin, driven with curl --path-as-is: on a basic-auth route, /admin/ returned 401 without credentials and 200 with valid credentials (controls correct), while all four crafted paths returned 200 with the protected page and NO credentials; on an ACL route,...
1.7.3Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:HA:N9.1/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NAccess Control