POST /upload uses the request-supplied resumableFilename directly as a key into the shared temporary directory, without the character filter it applies to resumableIdentifier and without namespacing it per user. A valid user holding the upload permission can read any file in that directory into their own home directory, append to it, and delete it.
This reproduces the cross-user batch-archive disclosure of GHSA-f74m-x83r-c4v4 through a different route — it still works with the fix for that advisory (PR #597) applied — and additionally allows deleting the login rate-limit lockfile.
Reported with explicit preconditions and bounded impact, as before: the primitive is confined to the temporary directory, not the whole filesystem.
backend/Controllers/UploadController.php:61 — $file_name = $request->input('resumableFilename', 'file') is not passed through the preg_replace('/[^0-9a-zA-Z_]/', '', ...) that line 66 applies to resumableIdentifier.$prefix namespaced by the sanitized username, but $file_name reaches the temporary storage at lines 118, 121 and 125 without that prefix.if ($chunks_size >= $total_size) is entered whenever resumableTotalSize is 0.for ($i = 1; $i <= $total_chunks; ++$i) does not execute when resumableTotalChunks is 0, so nothing is written to $file_name.readStream($file_name) therefore reads the pre-existing temporary file of that exact name.remove($file_name) deletes it.Path traversal outside the temporary directory is prevented by Tmpfs::sanitizeFilename(), so the primitive is bounded to that directory — but every user's transient objects share it.
Preconditions: a multi-user deployment with distinct per-user homedirs. The attacker is a valid low-privileged user holding upload (a...
7.15.0Exploitability
AV:NAC:HPR:LUI:RScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:LA:L5.9/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:LAccess Control