When generating models from an XML Schema (--input-file-type xmlschema), datamodel-code-generator resolves <xs:include>, <xs:import>, <xs:redefine>, and <xs:override> schemaLocation attributes against the source directory and reads the target with no restriction to the input/base directory. An attacker who controls the input XSD can read arbitrary files via ../ traversal or an absolute path, and the included schema's contents (type names, restrictions, enumerations) are folded into the generated output. Unlike the JSON-Schema $ref path, there is no allow_remote_refs control for XSD, so --no-allow-remote-refs does not mitigate it. This is an unauthenticated path-traversal / information-disclosure issue reachable in the default configuration.
The XSD parser walks include-style children and reads each schemaLocation with only an is_file() check (src/datamodel_code_generator/parser/xmlschema.py):
location = (source_dir / schema_location).resolve() # .resolve() collapses ../, escapes base
if location in seen or not location.is_file():
continue
included_root = self._parse_schema(_read_xml_text(location, self.encoding), location)
schema_location is attacker-controlled and _read_xml_text does path.read_bytes(). Because (source_dir / schema_location).resolve() normalizes .. and accepts absolute paths, the resolved target can be any file the process can read; there is no is_relative_to(base_path) containment (contrast the JSON-Schema HTTP-local branch, which does enforce it). The same unbounded read occurs both during version detection and during the main include-processing pass, so the included content is incorporated into the generated module.
Related vectors that were tested and do NOT apply (stdlib xml.etree.ElementTree is used): external-entity XXE file read does not occur (ElementTree does not fetch external entities), and entity-expansion "billion laughs" is rejected by...
0.62.0Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:HI:NA:N7.5/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N