Channel access is enforced only by the DataContainer voters (NewsletterChannelAccessVoter / NewsletterRecipientsAccessVoter, requiring USER_CAN_EDIT_CHANNEL), whose supportsType() fires exclusively for Create/Read/Update/DeleteAction subjects dispatched inside DC_Table's create/edit/delete methods. The newsletter custom key-actions are dispatched directly by Backend::getBackendModule() (Backend.php:324-327) after only the module-level USER_CAN_ACCESS_MODULE check; the DC_Table constructor runs no per-record ReadAction vote for a key-action. Newsletter.php contains no isGranted / denyAccess / isAdmin / hasAccess calls, and none of the newsletter DCAs have a checkPermission onload callback.
A channel-scoped newsletter editor can inject recipients into, mass-mail, and in some versions, delete/denylist recipients of channels they are not authorized to edit - defeating the per-channel permission model (integrity + abuse of the mail-sending capability).
This security vulnerability was found by @HDWSec
5.3.505.7.12Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:LUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:NI:LA:N4.3/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:NAccess Control
Other