PhpSpreadsheet's Worksheet\Drawing::setPath() validates an external-image URL against an operator-supplied isWhitelisted callback once, on the initial URL only, then fetches it with file_get_contents() using a stream context that does not set follow_location => 0. A whitelisted host that returns an HTTP 302 Location: redirect to an internal target is therefore followed by PHP's HTTP wrapper (default follow_location=1, max_redirects=20) with no re-validation of the redirect hop — defeating the whitelist and yielding a blind SSRF from the server.
This is an unfixed variant of CVE-2026-59931 (GHSA-6hq5-7373-42rg, the WEBSERVICE redirect-whitelist-bypass): the follow_location => 0 fix (commit 7ef7b25e) was applied ONLY to Calculation/Web/Service.php; Worksheet/Drawing.php was never touched.
src/PhpSpreadsheet/Worksheet/Drawing.php:
:125 (/^(http|https|file|ftp|s3):/) permits http/https (the redirect-following schemes) and runs on the initial URL only.if (!$allowExternal) at :128 (requires setAllowExternalImages(true); default false, BaseReader.php:55).if ($isWhitelisted !== null && !$isWhitelisted($path)) at :131 — validates the INITIAL URL only; never re-applied after a redirect.:140-152 sets user_agent + header (+ ssl.crypto_method for https) but omits follow_location. git grep follow_location on tag 5.9.0 yields a single hit — Service.php:45 (the CVE-2026-59931 fix) — confirming it was never added to Drawing.php.file_get_contents($path, false, $ctx) at :154.Blind SSRF from the server: reach and trigger internal GET-driven endpoints, coarse internal reachability/port probing, and reach cloud-metadata endpoints. The fetched body is written to a temp file, checked with isImage() (mime image/*, or application/octet-stream with bin/emf extension), only...
1.30.72.1.192.4.83.10.85.10.0Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:LUI:NScope
S:CImpact
C:LI:LA:N6.4/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:NAccess Control
Input Validation