On a self-hosted, single-tenant Budibase instance (multiTenancy:false), the public bootstrap endpoint POST /api/global/users/init remains fully exploitable after the instance has been provisioned. Its "already initialised" guard (checkAnyUserExists()) is evaluated inside a tenant-scoped database context derived from an attacker-controlled tenantId in the request body. Because the tenancy layer never constrains that tenantId to the only legitimate tenant (default) on a single-tenant deployment, an unauthenticated attacker simply supplies any unused tenant name to make the guard see an empty user list, and the endpoint then creates a brand-new CouchDB database (<tenantId>_global-db) and a global-admin user document (admin.global = true, builder.global = true) inside it - with no authentication and no CSRF token.
This is (a) a bypass of the security control meant to permanently close first-run setup, and (b) an unauthenticated, persistent write primitive that lets an anonymous attacker create an unbounded number of databases and admin-user documents - a resource-exhaustion / denial-of-service vector against the CouchDB datastore, plus creation of latent rogue admin accounts.
Root cause chain (source, tag v3.44.0):
packages/worker/src/api/index.ts:41 - POST /api/global/users/init is in PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS, so auth.buildAuthMiddleware(PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS) marks it publicEndpoint and the "no public access to worker" gate (api/index.ts:159-165) lets it through without any session. It is also in NO_TENANCY_ENDPOINTS (api/index.ts:83), so the tenancy middleware does not pin the request to default - the tenant is taken verbatim from the request body - and in NO_CSRF_ENDPOINTS.packages/worker/src/middleware/cloudRestricted.ts:10,25 - the cloudRestricted guard only enforces the internal API key when !env.SELF_HOSTED && !env.DISABLE_ACCOUNT_PORTAL. On a self-hosted...Exploitability
AV:NAC:LPR:NUI:NScope
S:UImpact
C:NI:LA:H8.2/CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:HAccess Control
Authentication
Configuration
Resource Management