nano-banana

Remote code download and execution detected

curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash

The skill's initialization process involves cloning a Git repository and installing dependencies using `bun install`. This executes arbitrary code from external sources, posing a significant supply chain risk if the repository or its dependencies are compromised.

git clone https://github.com/kingbootoshi/nano-banana-2-skill.git ... && bun install

The skill explicitly uses `FFmpeg` and `ImageMagick` for transparent asset generation. If the `nano-banana` CLI constructs commands for these tools using unsanitized user input (e.g., from prompts or filenames), it could lead to arbitrary command execution.

The `-t` flag ... uses FFmpeg `colorkey` + `despill` ... Requires: `brew install ffmpeg imagemagick`

The `-d, --dir` option allows specifying an arbitrary output directory. If the CLI does not properly sanitize or restrict this path, it could be abused to write files to sensitive system locations or overwrite critical files.

| `-d, --dir` | current directory | Output directory |

The fallback initialization instructions modify the user's `.zshrc` file to add `~/.local/bin` to the PATH. While common for CLI tools, this is a form of persistence by altering shell configuration.

echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.zshrc