Cover Image Generator

The skill loads configuration from `EXTEND.md` and processes content from user-provided article files and reference description files. Malicious content in these files could inject instructions or data into the agent's RAG context or working memory.

Load Preferences, Custom configurations via EXTEND.md, Deep analyze references ⚠️: Extract specific, concrete elements

The skill relies on `EXTEND.md` for 'Custom configurations' with a defined 'Schema'. If this schema allows for dynamic execution, script injection, or defining external resources, it could become a vector for supply chain attacks or command injection.

Custom configurations via EXTEND.md, Schema: [references/config/preferences-schema.md]

The `--quick` option allows skipping user confirmation, reducing human oversight. Additionally, a 'CRITICAL' blocking setup step for `EXTEND.md` could proceed autonomously without explicit user approval for sensitive operations.

--quick | Skip confirmation, use auto-selection, CRITICAL: If not found, complete setup BEFORE any other steps or questions.

The skill claims to 'generate' cover images but acts as an orchestrator, delegating the actual image generation to an unspecified external skill or model. It does not explicitly state which specific tool or API it calls for image generation, nor any associated URLs, which is a significant omission for understanding its full operational scope and potential external data interactions.

Workflow Step 4: 'Check image generation skills; if multiple, ask preference', 'Process references from prompt frontmatter: direct usage → pass via --ref (use ref-capable backend)', 'Generate: Call skill with prompt file, output path, aspect ratio'.